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ABSTRACT 
Liberal egalitarianism has been criticized for paying insufficient 
attention to what justice requires for the institutions that structure 
economic production.  In the light of such criticism, this paper 
investigates arguments that liberal egalitarians might give for the kinds 
of institutional reforms that critics have proposed.  These reforms 
include (1) guarantees for meaningful work, (2) worker participation in 
the governance of economic enterprises, and (3) democratic 
participation in the control of the means of production at the level of 
society.  The paper argues that liberal egalitarianism has much to say 
not only about questions regarding distribution, but also about 
questions regarding production. 
 
* For helpful discussion and comments, I thank Geoffrey Brennan, Sara Toomey, and seminar participants at the 
Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University.  I owe a special debt of gratitude to Robert 
Goodin for prompting me to write this paper and for his comments along the way.  For providing a hospitable 
environment in which to write the paper, I thank the Social and Political Theory Program of the Research School of 
Social Sciences, Australian National University.  I also thank the Legal Studies and Business Ethics Research 
Program and the Zicklin Center for Business Ethics Research for funding this research.  All errors remain my own. 
JUSTICE IN PRODUCTION 
 
What does liberal egalitarian justice require for the organization of economic production?  One 
answer is, not enough.  John Rawls’s account of justice, for example, has been criticized for not 
ruling out capitalist economic institutions and for not requiring institutional guarantees for 
meaningful work1 or worker participation in the governance of economic enterprises.2  Criticism 
along these lines is hardly new.  In a way, it recalls the Marxist critique of capitalism and 
liberalism.3  It also recalls the charge that the liberal tradition is inconsistent in its commitment to 
equal freedom on the one hand, and its one-time acceptance of the rule by property owners on 
the other.4  Of course, liberal egalitarians need not be moved by contemporary critiques of 
capitalism.  Capitalist economic institutions, they may say, are consistent with the requirements 
of liberal egalitarian justice. 
 
1 See, for example, Adina Schwartz, “Meaningful Work,” Ethics 92 (1982): 634-646. 
2 For arguments that Rawlsian justice requires some form of workplace democracy, see Iris Marion Young, “Self-
Determination as Principle of Justice,” The Philosophical Forum 11 (1979): 30-46; Rodney Peffer, “Towards a 
More Adequate Rawlsian Theory of Social Justice,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 75 (1994): 251-71; Rodney 
Peffer, Marxism, Morality, and Social Justice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Barry Clark and Herb 
Gintis, “Rawlsian Justice and Economic Systems,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 7 (1978): 302-325.  For an 
example of an account that argues that Rawlsian justice is better realized under a regime of workplace democracy, 
see David Schweikart, “Should Rawls Be a Socialist? A Comparison of His Ideal Capitalism with Worker-
Controlled Socialism,” Social Theory and Practice 5 (1978): 1-27.  Schweikart outlines a model of “democratic, 
worker-controlled, modified-market socialism” that he takes to be “decidedly superior to Rawls’s ideal capitalism, 
superior in terms of the ethical commitments exhibited in A Theory of Justice” (1). 
3 For one discussion of the Marxist critique and the construction of a Rawlsian response to it, see Allen Buchanan, 
Marx and Justice: The Radical Critique of Liberalism (Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1982).  For discussion of 
the view that Marx did not regard capitalism as unjust, see Alan Wood, “The Marxian Critique of Justice,” 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1972): 244-282. 
4 For discussion of this point in the context of the thought of John Locke, see, for example, Joshua Cohen, 
“Structure, Choice, and Legitimacy: Locke’s Theory of the State,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 15 (1986): 301-
324; John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969); C.B. 
Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982); and Alan 
Ryan, “Locke and the Dictatorship of the Bourgeoisie,” Political Studies 13 (1965): 219-230.  James Tully, in 
contrast, argues that “Locke extends the franchise to every adult male.” See A Discourse on Property: John Locke 
and His Adversaries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 173. 
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Not all liberal egalitarians, however, are so certain.  In Justice as Fairness, for example, 
John Rawls responds to what he takes to be the Marxist critique of liberalism by acknowledging 
as “a major difficulty” that justice as fairness “has not considered the importance of democracy 
in the workplace and in shaping the general course of the economy.”  Although Rawls concludes 
he “shall not pursue these questions,” he writes that “certainly these questions call for careful 
examination.  The long-run prospects of a just constitutional regime may depend on them.”5  
This suggests a need on the part of liberal egalitarianism to consider more fully what justice 
requires in the realm of economic production not only in response to critics, but also as part of 
the general inquiry into what justice requires for social institutions.6  In this paper, I take up this 
inquiry and argue that liberal egalitarianism places more restrictions on the structure of economic 
production than is frequently held to be case. 
The inquiry into what justice requires for economic production is meant to complement 
the emphasis that has been placed on interpreting questions of justice in terms of what Iris 
Marion Young has recently called a “distributive paradigm”—namely, a focus on the allocation 
of rights, goods, and opportunities among citizens.7  Young, among others, calls for a need to 
expand the scope of inquiry about what justice requires beyond a concern with questions about 
distribution.8  The inquiry in this paper follows along these lines.  This is not to deny the 
 
5 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness, edited by Erin Kelly (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2000), p. 178. 
6 Although I do not consider libertarian accounts of justice, there is reason to think that even on a libertarian account 
of justice, the organization of economic production matters.  Consider Robert Nozick’s procedural view of justice in 
Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974).  What preserves justice in economic affairs is 
voluntary exchange.  However, what distinguishes economic organizations is that the latter no longer involve market 
exchange.  Hence, a further account is required to understand what makes the transactions within an economic 
organization just.  I thank Robert Goodin for raising this point. 
7 Iris Marion Young, “Taking the Basic Structure Seriously,” Perspectives on Politics 4 (2006): 91-97, p. 91. 
8 Carol Gould, for example, writes, “recent theories of economic justice have generally focused on the question of 
just distribution of goods or wealth. … Very few, if any, of these theories have given significant attention to the 
question of justice in the organization of the production process…”  See Rethinking Democracy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 133.  See also Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic Books, 
1983) and Robert Wolff, Understanding Rawls: A Reconstruction and Critique of a Theory of Justice (Princeton: 
Justice in Production, p. 3 
Draft: 31 March 2006 
possibility of analyzing the structure of economic production from the perspective of a 
distributive paradigm.  First, the structure of economic production influences the distribution of 
income and wealth and the nature of economic opportunity.  For example, it has been argued that 
the distributional requirements of Rawls’s difference principle would be better satisfied by an 
economic regime that involved control of the means of production by citizens as a whole.9  
Second, questions about the reform of economic institutions can be recast as questions of 
distribution.  If, for example, we were to regard a claim to meaningful work to be a right whose 
allocation is of concern from the standpoint of justice, then we might consider the question of 
meaningful work to be one of distribution.  While acknowledging these points, the aim in this 
paper is to examine a distinct set of concerns that may be overlooked by focusing exclusively on 
questions of distribution.  To illustrate, in response to the first point, there may be reasons for 
choosing one economic regime over another that are independent of the distribution of income, 
wealth, and economic opportunity.  In response to the second point, even if the concern with 
meaningful work is cast as a question of distribution, there remains the question of why its 
distribution should be of concern in the first place. 
The emphasis on the relevance of questions of production for liberal egalitarianism can 
be compared with an analogous shift in emphasis in the discipline of economics.  Economics is 
said to have been relatively unconcerned about the organization of production, an attitude well 
summarized in Paul Samuelson’s remark “that in a perfectly competitive market it really doesn’t 
 
Princeton University Press, 1977).  One recent account that aims to put questions about work into central focus in 
contemporary political theory is Russell Muirhead, Just Work (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004).  
Another account is by Ian Shaprio, Democratic Justice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999).  For an account 
that integrates workplace democracy into a liberal egalitarian account of justice, see Ramon Vela, A Theory of 
Economic Democracy (Cambridge: unpublished dissertation at M.I.T., 2000). 
9 Barry Clark and Herb Gintis, “Rawlsian Justice and Economic Systems,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 7 (1978): 
302-25. 
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matter who hires whom: so have labor hire ‘capital.’”10  This relative lack of concern, according 
to Oliver Williamson, can be understood as the result of an emphasis in economics on the study 
of the allocation of scarce resources.11  To be certain, there have been scholars who have called 
for greater attention to the role of organizations in economics.12  Building on their insights, the 
study of organizations has become a central area of inquiry for economics, and the analysis in 
this paper draws upon this literature, often referred to as “the theory of the firm.”13  The shift 
away from an exclusive focus on questions of allocation in economics is somewhat analogous to 
a shift to consider not only questions of distribution, but also questions of production.  It even 
may have been the case that the focus in economics on questions of allocation supported 
adoption of a distributive paradigm when considering questions of justice. 
 
I. THE SCOPE OF INQUIRY 
The approach taken in this paper is to examine the extent to which commonly proposed reforms 
of capitalist economic institutions can be grounded in a broadly liberal egalitarian account of 
justice.  Reform of capitalist economic institutions has been proposed at three levels: that of the 
 
10 Paul Samuelson, “Wages and Interest: A Modern Dissection of Marxian Economic Models.” American Economic 
Review 47 (1957): 884-912, p. 894. 
11 Oliver Williamson, “The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract,” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 16 (2002): 171-195, p. 172.  Williamson quotes Lionel Robbins well-known definition of the 
discipline: “Economics is the science which studies human behavior as a relationship between ends and scarce 
means which have alternative uses.”  See Lionel Robbins, An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic 
Science (New York: New York University Press, 1932), p. 16. 
12 For examples see Chester Barnard, The Functions of the Executive (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938); 
Ronald Coase, “The Nature of the Firm,” Economica 4 (1937): 386-405; James March and Herbert Simon, 
Organizations (New York: John Wiley, 1958); Alfred Marshall, Industry and Trade (London: Macmillan, 1932); 
Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1942); and Herbert Simon, 
Administrative Behavior, 4th edition (New York: Free Press, 1997). 
13 The literature of the firm is vast and concerns a number of questions that fall outside the realm of this inquiry, 
including the boundaries of the firm and the reasons for the formation of firms in the first place.  For purposes of this 
analysis, the relevant concern will be on the characterization of authority, hierarchy, and power within the firm.  For 
a helpful survey of the literature, see Pierrre Garrouste and Stéphane Saussier, “Looking for a Theory of the Firm: 
Future Challenges,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 58 (2005): 178-199. 
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individual worker, economic enterprises, and society as a whole.14  The specific reforms 
considered are those that have been the main subjects of contemporary debate; they involve 
institutional guarantees for (1) meaningful work, (2) worker participation in the governance of 
enterprises in which they work, and (3) democratic participation in the control of the means of 
production at the level of society.  Insofar as these institutional guarantees are traditionally 
associated with socialism or communism, these institutional reforms may be labeled “non-
capitalist.”15  At the same time, capitalism admits of a wide variety and elements of these 
institutions can be found in what are categorized broadly as capitalist regimes.16  The German 
system of co-determination, for example, includes provisions for employee representation on 
supervisory boards of large-scale economic enterprises.17  Also, not all versions of socialism or 
communism have embraced these reforms in their entirety.18  The term “non-capitalist” is to be 
understood broadly when used to refer to these reforms.19 
 
14 In distinguishing three levels of analysis, I follow Paul Edwards and Judy Wajcman, The Politics of Working Life 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 7. 
15 Here is another intuition for calling these reforms non-capitalist.  Capitalism is often defined in terms of market 
exchange.  However, Herbert Simon makes the case that we now live in an “organization economy, or at most, in an 
organization/market economy, with a predominance of organizational over market activity.”  See Herbert Simon, 
“Public Administration in Today’s World of Organizations and Markets,” PS: Political Science and Politics 33 
(2000): 749-756, p. 751.  The intuition is that the focus on organizations is itself an area of inquiry that is “non-
capitalist.”  I thank Robert Goodin for raising this point. 
16 Peter Hall and David Soskice, eds., Varieties of Capitalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).  For a 
discussion of the variety in the organization of the employment relation, see David Marsden, A Theory of 
Employment Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
17 On the German system of co-determination and other forms of worker consultation and representation, see Joel 
Rogers and Wolfgang Streeck, eds., Works Councils (Chicago: University of Chicago  Press, 1995).  For another 
account, see Margaret Blair and Mark Roe, eds., Employees and Corporate Governance (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press, 1999). 
18 For example, worker participation in the governance of individual economic enterprises is not required under 
Lange-Lerner market socialism.  See Abba Lerner, Elements of Pure Economics (London: Allen and Unwin, 1954); 
Oskar Lange, “On the Economic Theory of Socialism: Part One,” Review of Economic Studies 4 (1936): 53-71; and 
Oskar Lange, “On the Economic Theory of Socialism: Part Two,” Review of Economic Studies 4 (1937): 123-142.  
Worker participation in the governance of economic institutions is also not a feature of John Roemer’s account of 
socialism.  See his A Future for Socialism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994). 
19 Although they raise important questions, this paper does not consider reforms aimed at the availability or 
guarantee of work.  Most contemporary industrial societies do not guarantee work for every able-bodied adult who 
seeks it.  Some critics of the market system have argued for such an institutional guarantee.  According to these 
authors, some form of state-guaranteed employment ought to be offered to able-bodied citizens.  This employment is 
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Although these reforms are often characterized as granting workers the ownership of 
assets normally owned by providers of capital under capitalism, in this paper, the relevant feature 
of these reforms is the degree and nature of control they accord workers in the context of 
economically productive activity.  Ownership is often thought to provide the owner of an asset 
with at least two claims: first, a claim to control its use and second, a claim to the benefit from its 
use.  The second claim is more an issue of distribution.  This is not to deny that exercising 
control has distributive consequences.  However, this paper aims to complement the emphasis 
placed on the distributive paradigm in addressing questions of justice.  Accordingly, I take the 
relevant focus to be the degree and nature of worker control, rather than ownership. 
Another set of considerations worth clarifying concerns the sense in which a given 
reform can be said to qualify as grounded in a liberal egalitarian account of justice.  First, by 
liberal egalitarianism, I have in mind the class of theories that are committed to equal liberty for 
citizens along with some degree of social and economic equality, taking Rawls’s theory of 
justice as the paradigmatic account.20  Second, for a given economic reform to be grounded in a 
liberal egalitarian account of justice, it is not enough that the reform simply be consistent with 
liberal egalitarianism.  There must be good reasons, on liberal egalitarian grounds, that argue in 
favor for a given reform.  The third point of clarification concerns the sense in which a given 
 
to be offered as a matter of right, and not in exchange for public assistance or as the form in which public assistance 
is to be offered.  See Richard Arneson, “Is Work Special?  Justice and the Distribution of Employment,” American 
Political Science Review, 84 (1990): 1127-1147.  State-guaranteed employment is to be distinguished from 
workfare.  For discussions about workfare, see Daniel Attas and Avner De-Shalit, “Workfare: The Subjection of 
Labour,” The Journal of Applied Philosophy 21 (2004): 309-320; Christopher Lake, Equality and Responsibility 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), ch. 7; Robert Solow, Work and Welfare (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1998); and Stuart White, The Civic Minimum: On the Rights and Obligations of Economic Citizenship 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
20 For a helpful discussion of liberal egalitarianism, see Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, 2nd 
edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).  For an interesting schematic representation of classes of theories 
of justice, see Peter Vallentyne, Hillel Steiner, and Michael Otsuka, “Why Left-Libertarianism is Not Incoherent, 
Indeterminate, or Irrelevant: A Reply to Fried,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 33 (2005): 201-215, p. 212. 
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reform is a subject of justice.  Rawls takes the proper subject of justice to be the “basic structure” 
which he defines as follows: 
The basic structure is the way in which the main political and social institutions 
of a society fit together into one system of social cooperation, and the way they 
assign basic rights and duties and regulate the division of advantages that arise 
from social cooperation over time.  The political constitution within an 
independent judiciary, the legally recognized forms of property, and the 
structure of the economy (for example, as a system of competitive markets with 
private property in the means of production), as well as the family in some form, 
all belong to the basic structure.21 
 
This conception of the basic structure points to three levels at which a reform can be considered 
a subject of justice for purposes of this analysis.  The first is at the level of a basic right.22  In 
Rawls’s framework, basic rights are those rights subject to constitutional protection and are 
required to provide the “political and social conditions essential for the adequate development 
and full exercise of the two moral powers of free and equal persons,” which are the capacity for a 
sense of justice and the capacity for a conception of the good.23  Rawls makes clear that rights 
regarding the ownership and control of productive assets are not basic in the same way as rights 
to freedom of thought and liberty of conscience, for example, are: 
Two wider conceptions of the right to property are not taken as basic: namely, 
(i) the right to private property in natural resources and means of production 
generally, including rights of acquisition and bequest; 
(ii) the right to property as including the equal right to participate in the control 
of the means of production and of natural resources, both of which are to be 
socially, not privately, owned.24 
 
These wider conceptions of the right to property “are not necessary for the adequate development 
and full exercise of the moral powers, and so are not an essential social basis of self-respect.”25  
 
21 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, p. 10. 
22 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, pp. 42-8. 
23 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, p. 45.  More fully, the first “is the capacity to understand, to apply, and to act from 
(and not merely in accordance with) the principles of political justice that specify the fair terms of social 
cooperation.”  The second is “the capacity to have, to revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of the good.”  See 
Rawls, Justice as Fairness, pp. 18-19. 
24 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, p. 114. 
25 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, p. 114. 
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This points to a second level at which a reform may be considered a subject of justice—that is, a 
reform that concerns the fundamental structure of the economy, but is not subject to 
constitutional protection.  A third level at which a reform will be considered a subject of justice 
in this paper is less fundamental than the second.  This level involves policies enacted by the 
legislature to best realize justice in the light of specific economic and social conditions.  
Different conditions may call for a different set of policies.  The line between the second and 
third levels is not sharp; reforms may encompass both levels.26 
As a final point of clarification, this analysis does not involve a comparison of capitalist 
and non-capitalist institutions with regard to considerations such as productive efficiency or the 
overall level of economic output.  To be certain such considerations are important in making a 
final evaluation of the choice of an economic regime.  Although a common objection against 
non-capitalist institutions is to say that they are comparatively less efficient than capitalist 
institutions, I leave such considerations aside.  To begin, there is debate about the comparative 
efficiency of different economic institutions.27  Arguments that non-capitalist institutions are less 
efficient, for example, have been criticized on grounds that they only engage in only a partial 
equilibrium analysis and overlook the possibility that non-capitalist forms of organization may 
 
26 The analysis in this paper focuses on work and production outside of the household.  As a result, it overlooks an 
important aspect of the basic structure: the division of labor within the household and between the sexes.  On this, 
see, for example, S.A. Lloyd, “Family Justice and Social Justice,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 75 (1994): 353-
371; Will Kymlikca, “Rethinking the Family,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 20 (1991): 77-97; Susan Moller Okin, 
“Justice and Gender,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 16 (1987): 42-72; and Susan Moller Okin, “Political 
Liberalism, Justice and Gender,” Ethics 105 (1994): 23-43. 
27 For discussions on this point, see for example, Gregory Dow, Governing the Firm: Workers’ Control in Theory 
and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) and Henry Hansmann, The Ownership of Enterprise 
(Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1996).  For an earlier survey, see Michael McPherson, “Efficiency and Liberty in the 
Productive Enterprise: Recent Work in the Economics of Work Organization,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12 
(1983): 354-368.  There is also the Marxist view that social ownership of means of production will unfetter forces of 
production.  On this point see, for example, G.A. Cohen, Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defense (Princeton:  
Princeton University Press, 1979). 
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be just as efficient, if not more, when they comprise the whole of the economy.28  More 
generally, even if it is the case that economic considerations count against non-capitalist 
institutions, it seems important to understand precisely at what expense such economic gains are 
to be made in choosing one set of institutions and policies over another.  In this analysis, I aim to 
provide some of that understanding. 
 
II. INDIVIDUALS AND THE CONTENT OF WORK 
One criticism of capitalism has been that one of its central organizing principles—the division of 
labor—creates the prospect of highly specialized jobs that are routine, boring, and devoid of 
meaning.  Traditionally, this has been a criticism raised against factory work, especially when 
contrasted with the prospect for creativity and variety traditionally associated with the work of 
craftsmen and artisans.29  It is also a criticism raised against jobs in the service sector in which 
mental and psychological work, for example, takes on the commoditized nature of manual work 
in the manufacturing sector.30 
Critics of the capitalism, in turn, have called for institutional guarantees that all work is 
meaningful.  Richard Arneson provides one characterization of meaningful work—namely, work 
that is “interesting, that calls for intelligence and initiative, and that is attached to a job that gives 
the worker considerable freedom to decide how the work is to be done and a democratic say over 
 
28 Louis Putterman is among those who raise this point.  See “The Firm as Association versus the Firm as 
Commodity,” Economics and Philosophy 4 (1988): 243-266, p. 262. 
29 In The Manifesto of the Communist Party, for example, Frederick Engels and Karl Marx write “owing to 
extensive use of machinery and to division of labour, the work of the proletarians has lost all individual character, 
and consequently, all charm for the workman.  He becomes an appendage of the machine, and it is only the most 
simple, most monotonous, and most easily acquired knack, that is required of him.”  See The Marx-Engels Reader, 
2nd edition, Robert Tucker, ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1978), p. 479.  See also Harry Braverman, Labor and 
Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century (New York: The Monthly Review Press, 
1974). 
30 For one discussion of work along these lines, see Arlie Hochschild, The Managed Heart: Commercialization of 
Human Feeling (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983). 
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the character of the work process and the policies pursued by the employing enterprise.”31  The 
last feature Arneson associates with meaningful work—“a democratic say over the policies 
pursued by the employing enterprise”—concerns economic production at the organizational level 
and is often advanced by way of arguments independent from those associated with meaningful 
work.  Accordingly, the focus of this section will be institutional guarantees regarding the 
content of work, leaving aside the question of the democratic participation by workers in the 
governance of economic enterprises as a distinct consideration for section III. 
 
II.1. Neutrality 
One argument for institutional guarantees that all work is meaningful is associated with Karl 
Marx’s critique of the division of labor.  According to this interpretation of Marx’s critique, 
meaningful work is required in order to realize the claim that all workers have to self-
realization.32  Another version of this argument is grounded directly in the thought of Aristotle.  
On this version of the argument, the division of labor relegates some workers to the role of 
executing what they themselves have not conceptualized; meaningful work is required to 
overcome this separation of execution from conception.33  Arguments along these lines hold that 
meaningful work is part of a good life or is required for the exercise of what might be called a 
“thick” conception of autonomy.  In contrast to a “thin” conception of autonomy according to 
which a person is free so long as she is not constrained in her choices, a “thick” conception 
 
31 Richard, Arneson, “Meaningful Work and Market Socialism,” Ethics, 97 (1987): 517-545, p. 522. 
32 See Capital, vol. 1, ch. 14; The German Ideology; and The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844.  
For a contemporary interpretation of Marx on this point, see Jon Elster, “Self-realization in Work and Politics: The 
Marxist Conception of the Good Life,” Social Philosophy and Policy, 6 (1986): 97-126. 
33 James Murphy, The Moral Economy of Labor: Aristotelian Themes in Economic Theory (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1993). 
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requires additional conditions to be met for a person to be considered autonomous.  She may, for 
example, have to have developed her capacities to the fullest. 
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls acknowledges the value of meaningful work from the 
perspective of human flourishing and autonomy.34  The value of meaningful work, however, is 
not part of Rawls’s argument for the institutions that comprise the basic structure.  One reason 
for this is Rawls’s rejection of the perfectionist view that a specific conception of the good life 
ought to inform the basic structure or the policies pursued by the state.  The above accounts 
locate the value of meaningful work directly in a conception of the good or by way of a “thick” 
conception of autonomy that may be thought to rely on a conception of the good.  Hence, 
arguments along the above lines are unlikely candidates for a plausible liberal egalitarian account 
in defense of institutional guarantees for meaningful work on grounds of justice.35 
Reasoning along these lines, however, may justify a more moderate version of the 
proposal that all work be meaningful.  This more moderate proposal is a policy that guarantees 
reasonable options for meaningful work, even if not all jobs meet the criteria for meaningful 
work.  The reasoning is as follows.  Insofar as not guaranteeing such options amounts to 
promoting a particular conception of work—namely, highly specialized and routine work—then, 
there may be good reason on liberal grounds to ensure options for meaningful work.  Call this 
argument for a policy that guarantees the reasonable option of meaningful work a neutrality-
based argument. 
The question then for liberal egalitarians is to determine what constitutes a reasonable 
option for meaningful work and what economic institutions and policies are required to ensure 
 
34 A Theory of Justice, revised edition (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1999), section 79, pp. 463-464. 
35 See Muirhead, Just Work, pp. 21-26.  For one discussion of neutrality, see Will Kymlicka, “Liberal Individualism 
and Liberty Neutrality,” Ethics, 99 (1989): 883-905. 
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such an option for all citizens.  One possibility is that the state need do no more than provide 
citizens with the education and training to pursue meaningful work.  Another possibility is for 
the state to guarantee that some subset of jobs that meet the standards set forward for meaningful 
work.  Still another possibility is that by providing citizens with a basic income, the state puts 
citizens in a position so that they need not accept work if it does not meet the criteria set forth for 
meaningful work.36  In short, depending on what it means to ensure options for meaningful work 
and the empirical assumptions that one makes about the operation of the economy, the policies 
required for meaningful work will vary in the extent to which they deviate from the institutions 
and policies of contemporary capitalist economies. 
 
II.2. Formative Arguments 
The second line of argument for the institutional guarantee of meaningful work is found in early 
concerns voiced about the formative influences of the division of labor.  Consider Adam Smith’s 
oft-quoted evaluation of the impact of the division of labor on workers: 
The understandings of the greater part of men are necessarily formed by their 
ordinary employments.  The man whose whole life is spent in performing a few 
simple operations … has no occasion to exert his understanding, or to exercise 
his invention in finding out expedients for removing difficulties which never 
occur.  He naturally loses, therefore, the habit of such exertion, and generally 
becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become.  
… His dexterity at his own particular trade seems, in this manner, to be acquired 
at the expence of his intellectual, social, and martial virtues.37 
 
 
36 Philippe Van Parijs, Real Freedom for All (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).  Brian Barry, “Real Income 
and Basic Income,” Journal of Political Philosophy 4 (1996): 242-277; Robert van der Veen, “Real Freedom and 
Basic Income: Comment on Brian Barry,” Journal of Political Philosophy 5 (1997): 274-286; John Cunliffe and 
Guido Erreygers, “‘Basic Income? Basic Capital!’ Origins and Issues of a Debate,” Journal of Political Philosophy 
11 (2003): 89-110. 
37 Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, V.i.f.50.  Alfred Marshall also wrote, “the business by which a person earns 
his livelihood fills his thoughts during by far the greatest part of those hours in which his mind is at its best: during 
them his character is being formed by the ways in which he uses his faculties at work,” in Principles of Economics, 
8th ed., (London: Macmillan, 1938), pp. 1-2. 
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Although Smith held that the benefits of the division of labor were such to count in its favor as a 
system of economic organization, other commentators following him were more critical in their 
evaluation of what they saw as the formative influences of the division of labor on workers.38  
Based upon these concerns, meaningful work is needed not only to counter the formative 
influences of the division of labor, but also to ensure that workers have the opportunity to 
develop the requisite capacities whose loss is of concern.  Call such arguments for institutional 
reform, formative arguments. 
From the perspective of liberal egalitarianism, the most plausible account for meaningful 
work along the above lines is likely to be found in an account focused on the formative 
influences of work on a person’s autonomy.  Adina Schwartz advances just such an argument.39  
Schwartz defines persons as autonomous “to the extent that they rationally form and act on some 
overall conception of what they want in life.”  According to Schwartz, “people achieve 
autonomy to the extent that they lead lives of intelligence and initiative.”40  For Schwartz, jobs in 
contemporary capitalist economies give rise to two problems.  First, a person cannot be said to be 
fully autonomous unless there is a kind of integration across her pursuits in line with her broader 
goals.  Following the discussion in section II.1, this characterization of the requirements for 
autonomy may strike some liberal egalitarians as objectionable.  They may ask, for example, 
why work that lacks autonomy could not be part of an autonomously chosen goal.  The second 
point Schwartz raises, however, should give them pause.  According to Schwartz, work that does 
not meet the standard of meaningful work causes individuals to be “made less capable of and less 
interested in rationally framing, pursuing, and adjusting their own plans during the rest of their 
 
38 See, for example, Marx. 
39 Schwartz, “Meaningful Work.” 
40 Schwartz, “Meaningful Work,” p. 636. 
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time.”41  The second point echoes the concerns raised by earlier critics of the market system note 
above.  Framed in terms of an individual’s capacity and interest in autonomy, this concern about 
the formative influences of capitalism allows for consideration of an argument for institutional 
guarantees for meaningful work in a way that would appear to be grounded in considerations of 
liberal egalitarian justice. 
Central to the plausibility of grounding a formative argument in defense of institutional 
guarantees for meaningful work is the empirical support for such an argument.  In support of her 
argument, Schwartz draws upon the work of Melvin Kohn and Carmi Schooler.42  Proponents of 
formative arguments may also point to related research in which work is held to have significant 
formative influences on a variety of personal traits, many of which relate to autonomy.43  As 
proponents of formative arguments consider further research along these lines, one point that 
requires some attention is the precise causal relation invoked between work and autonomy.  At 
least four claims could be made about this relation: first, that meaningful work is the only kind of 
activity that enables the development of the capacity for autonomy; second, that meaningful 
work is one way to promote the development of the capacity for autonomy; third, engaging in 
non-meaningful work degrades the capacity for autonomy; and fourth, that autonomy is the kind 
of capacity that degrades without active exercise.  Depending on the claim invoked, the nature of 
the argument for the concern with the content and organization of work varies.  For example, 
whereas the first and third claims grounds an argument for direct concern with the content and 
 
41 Schwartz, “Meaningful Work,” p. 637. 
42 Melvin Kohn and Carmi Schooler, Work and Personality: An Inquiry into the Impact of Social Stratification 
(Norwood: Ablex, 1983). 
43 For example, see Robert Lane, “Waiting for Lefty: The Capitalist Genesis of Socialist Man,” Theory & Society, 6 
(1978): 1-28 as well as Robert Lane, The Market Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).  See, 
for example, Robert Goodin, “Moral Atrophy in the Welfare State,” Policy Sciences, 26 (1993): 63-67. 
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organization of work, the second claim does not.  The second claim is only an argument for 
ensuring adequate opportunities in some area of life for the exercise of autonomy. 
 
II.3. Unavoidable Work 
In “The Soul of Man Under Socialism,” Oscar Wilde writes: 
All unintellectual labour, all monotonous, dull labour, all labour that deals with 
dreadful things, and involves unpleasant conditions, must be done by machinery.  
Machinery must work for us in coal minds and do all sanitary services, and be 
the stoker of steamers, and clean the streets, and run messages on wet days and 
do anything that is tedious or distressing.44 
 
Wilde’s essay points to the unavoidability of work that does not meet the qualifications set 
forward for work to be considered meaningful.  As such, in the absence of the automation 
envisioned by Wilde, proposals for institutional guarantees that all work is meaningful may be 
thought unrealistic.  Furthermore, even if proponents of meaningful work were to accept this 
objection, the question arises as to the appropriate manner in which to deal with work that is 
unavoidable, but fails to meet the criteria set forth for meaningful work.  In this section, I outline 
what a liberal egalitarian response to these considerations might look like if it is to accommodate 
the reform that all work be meaningful. 
The intuition that there is unavoidable work from the perspective of a liberal egalitarian 
account of justice builds upon Rawls’s conception of primary goods.  Primary goods, in Rawls’s 
account, are “the various social conditions and all-purpose means that are generally necessary to 
enable citizens adequately … to pursue their determinate conceptions of the good.”45 Even 
though the list of primary goods involves a normative conception in specifying those goods are 
required, it does not require invoking a conception of good in a manner that violates the 
 
44 The Complete Works of Oscar Wilde. 
45 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, pp. 57-58. 
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neutrality constraint discussed in section II.1.46  Unavoidable work, simply put, is any work that 
is required at the level of society as a whole to provide for those social conditions and means for 
citizens to be able to pursue their own conceptions of the good. 
The challenge then is to develop criteria for work that fails to meet the requirements of 
meaningful work in a way that is compatible with the neutrality constraint discussed above.47  In 
his discussion of the division of labor, Rawls writes that in a just society, “the worst aspects of 
this division can be surmounted: no one need be servilely dependent on others and made to 
choose between monotonous and routine occupations which are deadening to human thought and 
sensibility.”48  This suggests one way in which to define work that fails to meet the criteria of 
meaningful work—that is, work that citizens would see no reason to undertake from the 
perspective of their conception of the good except for the sole purpose of obtaining the level of 
primary goods they would otherwise receive in a just society.  The basic intuition is that certain 
kinds of work that are such that they play no role in a person’s conception of the good except for 
purely instrumental purposes of attaining a certain degree of remuneration.  These kinds of work 
might be said to fail to meet the requirements of meaningful work in the context of a liberal 
egalitarian state.49 
How might a liberal egalitarian state deal with work that is unavoidable but does not meet 
the criteria set forth for meaningful work?  Given the way in which work was said to lack in 
 
46 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, p. 58 
47 Prostitution, for example, is often put forward as an example of work that is degrading, but nevertheless raises a 
challenge with regard to regulation in a liberal state.  For a recent discussion, see Scott Anderson, “Prostitution and 
Sexual Autonomy: Making Sense of the Prohibition of Prostitution,” Ethics 112 (2002): 748-780. 
48 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 464. 
49 “To escape facing this fact,” wrote George Bernard Shaw, “we may plead that some people have such very queer 
tastes that it is almost impossible to mention an occupation that you will not find somebody with a craze for… .”  
See The Intelligent Women’s Guide to Socialism, p. 107.  This definition of meaningless work accords with Alfred 
Marshall’s definition of labor: “any exertion of mind or body undergone partly or wholly with a view to some good 
other than the pleasure derived solely from the work” Principles of Economics, Book II, Chapter 3, 2. 
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meaning, guaranteeing greater remuneration itself is unlikely to be the most effective means by 
which to address such work.  This suggests the need for other means.  One such set of 
alternatives is found in Michael Walzer’s discussion of hard work.50  One alternative is 
conscription, as followed in the case of the military draft.  Another alternative is to require all 
citizens to participate directly, at some point in their lives, in such work.  A third alternative is to 
enable self-management on the part of workers engaged in such work.  In this analysis, given 
that unavoidability is cast in terms of the need for primary goods at a social level, perhaps the 
most plausible approach is to attach a degree of public recognition to the importance of the 
unavoidable work that is being done.  This might include greater financial remuneration, but the 
nature of such remuneration under this solution would avoid the problem noted at the outset. 
One area in which there is reason to think that such an account of meaningful work is 
needed is with respect to questions involving global justice.  What does an account of global 
justice require for economic activity that that does not meet the criteria for meaningful work in 
developed economies and is then performed by workers in developing economies?  Does justice 
demand full citizenship for workers who arrive from developing economies to perform work that 
does not meet the criteria put forward for meaningful work in a developed economy?  In 
suggesting one way in which to think about meaningful work in the context of liberal 
egalitarianism, it is hoped that this discussion will point the way to a more complete account of 
the requirements of liberal egalitarianism for the content and allocation of work.51 
 
 
50 Walzer, Spheres of Justice, pp. 165-183. 
51 Iris Marion Young, “Responsibility and Global Labor Justice,” Journal of Political Philosophy 12 (2004): 365-
388. 
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III. ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS AND WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY 
A central concern for critics of capitalism is what they regard as the treatment of labor as a 
commodity to be exchanged in much the same way as goods and services in the market.52  In 
focusing on the highly specialized and routine nature of certain jobs, arguments about 
meaningful work address aspects associated with treating labor as a commodity.  There is one 
aspect, however, that is not necessarily addressed by the above arguments, but has been of 
concern to critics of the market system from the perspective of the individual worker’s 
experience.  This aspect is the employment relationship. 
Of the various ways to characterize the employment relationship, a helpful 
characterization for this analysis is in terms of the assignment of residual decision-making 
rights.53  To possess residual decision-making rights over some set of actions and/or outcomes 
within a relationship is to have the final say over those actions and/or outcomes in the case that 
no decision was specified for them at the outset of the relationship.  Within the employment 
relationship, the employer is assigned residual decision-making rights regarding an employee’s 
actions or outcomes affecting an employee.  This should not be taken to mean that employers are 
unrestricted in the decisions they are entitled to make regarding employees.  General restrictions, 
such as prohibitions against sexual harassment or a minimum wage, along with specific 
restrictions negotiated at the outset of employment are all consistent with the idea of 
employment.  Nor should this characterization of the employment relationship be taken to rule 
 
52 For contemporary versions of this idea, characterized as the “renting” of labor, see David Ellerman, Property and 
Contract in Economics: The Case for Economic Democracy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992) and Carole Pateman, “Self-
Ownership and Property in the Person: Democratization and a Tale of Two Concepts,” Journal of Political 
Philosophy 10 (2002): 20-53. 
53 Here I draw upon Herbert Simon, “A Formal Theory of the Employment Relationship,” Econometrica 19 (1951): 
293-305.  In Simon’s account, the employer and employee negotiate the terms of the relationship ex ante.  For an 
account in which the terms are not negotiable, see Roy Radner, “Hierarchy: The Economics of Managing,” Journal 
of Economic Literature 30 (1992): 1382-1415. 
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out the possibility of a right to exit on the part of employees or the possibility for employers and 
employees to negotiate within the relationship.  The point is that within the context of the 
employment relationship, the employer possesses a degree of decision-making over what the 
employee does during her employment and over the outcomes that affect the employee in the 
case that these decisions are not specified in advance.  It is this relinquishing of a degree of 
control over her labor and the outcomes affecting her in the context of work that gives rise to the 
characterization of the employment relationship as treating the worker’s labor as a commodity 
for exchange. 
As an alternative to the employment relationship, this analysis considers the possibility of 
“workplace democracy”—a regime in which workers are institutionally guaranteed the right to 
participate in determining the policies that affect them and in governing the enterprise more 
generally.  There is great diversity among proposals for workplace democracy.  Some accounts 
define workplace democracy as the exclusive and direct control of an economic enterprise by all 
those who work in the enterprise as in the case of some worker cooperatives.54  Other accounts 
call for a system of co-determination in which workers share control of an economic enterprise 
with the providers of capital.55  What these accounts have in common is that they represent 
alternatives to the employment relationship insofar as they grant workers some share of the 
residual control rights discussed above. 
In recognition of the diversity of proposals that have been advanced under the heading of 
workplace democracy, this paper takes a fairly inclusive definition of workplace democracy.  To 
begin, guarantee of the worker’s right to participate in governance is taken to be independent of 
 
54 See, for example, John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy, chapter VII, sections 6, 7.  For a 
contemporary discussion of worker cooperatives in the U.S. context, see John Pencavel, Worker Participation: 
Lessons from the Worker Co-ops of the Pacific Northwest (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001). 
55 For a description of co-determination, see Rogers and Streeck, Works Councils. 
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any claims of ownership on the part of workers.  In addition, the paper places no constraints on 
whether worker participation is direct or representative.  Furthermore, the paper allows for the 
possibility that workers and providers of capital share control of the enterprise as in the system of 
co-determination.  For a regime to count as one of workplace democracy, workers must be 
guaranteed at a minimum an equal say as the providers of capital. 
As noted in section II, arguments for alternatives to the employment relationship are 
considered distinct from arguments for meaningful work.  At the limit, it may appear that for 
work to be meaningful, the worker must be in possession of all residual decision-making rights.  
At the same time, it appears plausible to imagine cases of work that meets the criteria of 
meaningful work within the context of the employment relationship.  For example, the content of 
the work could be interesting and require a great deal of initiative even though the worker 
remains an employee.  One reason for this is that even though the individual worker enjoys a 
great deal of control over her own work, if she works in a large-scale economic organization, a 
number of decisions that affect her conditions at work may remain beyond her control.  
Furthermore, there are forms of work that do away with the employment relationship, but do not 
appear to meet the criteria for meaningful work.  Consider, for example, the Mondragón 
Corporación Cooperativa (MCC) in the Basque region of Spain.  Among worker cooperatives, 
MCC is considered highly successful.56  Nevertheless, it has been argued that despite worker 
control at the level of the economic enterprise, the immediate experience for workers varies little 
 
56 William Foote Whyte and Kathleen King Whyte, Making Mondragon: The Growth and Dynamics of the Worker 
Cooperative Complex, 2nd ed. (Ithaca: ILR Press, 1991). 
Justice in Production, p. 21 
Draft: 31 March 2006 
in comparison to those in traditional capitalist firms.57  In this case, he conditions of work would 
not appear to meet the criteria set forward for that of meaningful work. 
As a final point of clarification, it should be noted that focusing on workplace democracy 
is not meant to deny the possibility of other alternatives to the employment relationship, such as 
an economic regime of self-employment or independent contracting.  This focus reflects the 
prevalence of large-scale economic enterprises in modern economies and the emphasis that 
critics of capitalism have placed on workplace democracy as an alternative. 
 
III.1. Collective and Individual Control 
For many accounts of workplace democracy, the collective nature of decision-making on the part 
of workers is of intrinsic relevance.  What matters for these accounts is that workers, as a group, 
engage in the exercise of residual decision-making rights within an economic enterprise.  This 
line of thought is grounded in the ideals of solidarity and fraternity underlying certain criticisms 
of the market system.58 
In contrast, in this analysis I focus on arguments in which the collective nature of 
decision-making under workplace is relevant only insofar as it helps to realize some further goal 
or value.  One reason for this is that such arguments are more likely to be consistent with liberal 
egalitarianism by avoiding a perfectionist account of human good in which the act of collective 
decision-making is itself a component of the good.  To be clear, this is not meant to imply that 
 
57 Sharryn Kasmir, The Myth of Mondragon: Cooperatives, Politics, and Working-Class Life in a Basque Town 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), pp.145-168. 
58 On this, see David Miler, “To What Extent Must Socialism Be Communitarian?” Social Philosophy and Policy 6 
(1989): 6: 51-73. 
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only outcomes matter for the justification of a claim to democratic decision-making.59  For 
example, collective decision-making by workers might matter only insofar as such a decision-
making process is the most equitable manner in which to enable the exercise of some right on the 
part of each worker.  This emphasis is consistent with an interpretation of democratic governance 
in which what justifies democratic rule is not that individuals are acting in concert, but rather that 
democracy is what justifies the relationship between the state and an individual citizen. 
 
III.2. Neutrality-Based and Formative Arguments 
Similar to the case for institutional guarantees for meaningful work, there are arguments 
grounded in a thick conception of autonomy.  Carol Gould advances one such an argument.  She 
argues that justice entails an equal claim on the part of citizens to the conditions for “self-
development” by which she means “the freedom to develop oneself through one’s actions, or as a 
process realizing one’s projects through activity in the course of which one forms one’s character 
and develops capacities.”60  Workplace democracy, according to Gould, is among the conditions 
for such self-development.61 
Although considerations of neutrality make arguments along the above lines unlikely 
candidates for a liberal egalitarian argument for workplace democracy, as in the case of 
meaningful work, there are good reasons to accept neutrality-based arguments for institutional 
guarantees for an option for workplace democracy.  One such argument is advanced by David 
 
59 On the plausibility of instrumental justifications for democracy, see Christopher Griffin, “Democracy as a Non-
Instrumentally Just Procedure,” Journal of Political Philosophy 11 (2003): 111-121 and Richard Arneson, 
“Defending the Purely Instrumental Account of Democratic Legitimacy, Journal of Political Philosophy 11 (2003): 
122-132. 
60 Gould, Rethinking Democracy, p. 40.  Patricia Werhane advances a similar argument; she writes “the right to 
participation is an instantiation of the basic moral right to autonomy and self-development.”  See Persons, Rights, 
and Corporations (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1985), p. 133. 
61 Gould, Rethinking Democracy, pp. 133-159. 
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Miller.62  Miller argues that a liberal state ought to subsidize worker cooperatives in a capitalist 
economy in order to offset what are, in effect, the negative externalities created by capitalist 
firms for cooperatives.63  When workers have available to them the possibility of working as 
employees in capitalist firms, one disadvantage that cooperatives face is with regard to hiring 
new members.  Whereas a capitalist firm is willing to hire an additional worker so long as her 
marginal revenue product is at least what she is willing to be paid, a worker cooperative is 
willing to hire her so long as her average revenue product is at least what she is willing to be 
paid.  Unless the marginal product of hiring an additional worker never decreases, which seems 
unlikely, there are workers, if hired, whose marginal revenue product is at least what they are 
willing to be paid, but whose average revenue product is not.  These workers will be hired by 
capitalist firms, but not by cooperatives.64 
The second, and more significant, disadvantage for cooperatives firms in a capitalist 
economy, according to Miller, concerns the availability of capital.  Given that capital is owned 
collectively once the loan is repaid, cooperative workers find it individually to their advantage to 
delay repayment of the loan.  In turn, the lending agency faces the prospect of loaning ever-
increasing amounts to the cooperative and in the case of its bankruptcy, the difficulty of 
collecting from a firm owned collectively by a number of individuals.  All things being equal, 
lending agencies will find it in their interest to loan capital to capitalist firms over cooperatives.65  
 
62 David Miller, Market, State and Community: Theoretical Foundations of Market Socialism (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1989).  For general discussion of the prevalence of worker cooperatives in addition to the sources cited in 
notes 25 and 26, see Jon Elster, “From Here to There: If Co-operative Ownership Is So Desirable, Why Are There 
So Few Co-operatives?” Social Philosophy and Policy 6 (1989): 93-111. 
63 He takes the key features of a worker cooperative to be the following: the exercise of residual control rights on the 
basis of one vote per person; the absence of residual control rights by outside suppliers of capital; and the sharing of 
profits among members as income.  Miller, Market, State and Community, p. 83. 
64 James Meade, “The Theory of Labour-Managed Firms and of Profit Sharing,” Economic Journal 82 (1972): 402-
428. 
65 Miller, Market, State and Community, p. 89. 
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Given these disadvantages, and particularly the latter, unless the state supports institutions to 
provide capital to cooperatives, it is unlikely that there would be opportunities for workers to 
participate in worker cooperatives.  In effect, according to Miller, reasons for neutrality would 
require even a liberal state to subsidize some form of workplace democracy. 
Like the neutrality-based argument for meaningful work, this argument may not 
completely assuage critics of the market insofar as capitalist firms remain a possibility.66  At the 
same time, this line of argument would appear to provide solid liberal egalitarian grounds on 
which to support workplace democracy, if not at the level of a basic right, at least as a matter of 
policy.  The argument is not that worker cooperatives are inherently less efficient and require 
subsidies, but rather that if no one conception of the good life is to be favored with regard to the 
organization of work, then worker cooperatives will require some subsidy if both they and 
capitalist firms are to be available as meaningful options for workers. 
As in the case for the argument for meaningful work, empirical considerations play a 
central role in defending such a policy on liberal egalitarian grounds.  In this instance, the 
empirical considerations concern the question of why there are so few worker cooperatives in 
modern economies.  For example, Robert Nozick has argued that if workers valued participating 
in worker cooperatives, then they would be willing to accept some degree of economic sacrifice 
for that opportunity.  Unless the economic costs are so great, the fact that there are so few 
cooperatives would suggest that there is little interest in them such that it would be unreasonable 
for the liberal state to subsidize their operation.67  Hence, the plausibility of the neutrality-based 
 
66 On the view that arguments for workplace democracy require at most the availability of options for workplace 
democracy, see Richard Arneson, “Democratic Rights at National and Workplace Levels,” The Idea of Democracy 
edited by David Copp, Jean Hampton, and John Roemer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993): 118-148. 
67 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), ch. 10. 
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argument relies a great deal on answering the more general question in economics as to why 
capital hires labor.68 
Joshua Cohen outlines a version of a formative argument for workplace democracy based 
upon the work of Carole Pateman.69  According Cohen’s version of the argument, two 
psychological conditions are of “special importance in a well-functioning democracy.”  The first 
is the “sense that social arrangements are malleable and subject to improvement, and that one’s 
own efforts can contribute to their improvement.”  The second is “the capacity to judge in terms 
of common good, and an effective desire to act on such judgments.”  Because capitalist work 
relations “vest final authority in the owners of capital, they limit the extent of intra-firm 
democracy, thereby fostering passivity and a narrower basis of political judgment.”70  In turn, in 
order to ensure development of the two psychological conditions required for the functioning of 
democracy, democracy is required at the level of economic enterprises.  In contrast to the 
neutrality-based argument for options for workplace democracy, the formative argument for 
workplace democracy would appear to require an economic regime in which all enterprises 
operated according to the principles of workplace democracy. 
Again, as in the case of formative arguments for meaningful work, empirical 
considerations play a central role in the plausibility of grounding a formative argument for 
 
68 In addition to the references in notes 25 and 26, see Gregory Dow and Louis Putterman, “Why Capital Suppliers 
(Usually) Hire Workers: What We Know and What We Need to Know,” Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization, 43 (2000): 319-336. 
69 Carole Pateman, Participation and Democracy Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).  Joshua 
Cohen generalizes this argument for workplace democracy into what he calls the “psychological support argument.” 
See his “The Economic Basis of Deliberative Democracy,” Social Philosophy and Policy 6 (1989): 25-50, pp. 28-
29. Robert Lane makes a similar argument in “Government and Esteem,” Political Theory 10 (1982): 5-31, pp. 20-
21. 
70 Cohen, “The Economic Basis of Deliberative Democracy,” pp. 28-29. 
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workplace democracy in a liberal egalitarian account of justice.71  For example, could the 
conditions for the development of the requisite psychological conditions among citizens be 
guaranteed independent of the circumstances at work?  In what ways are the conditions for 
individual autonomy related to conditions relevant for the psychology of citizens?  It seems there 
is good reason to investigate further the answers to these and other questions about the 
relationship between the nature of work and the psychology of citizens in a liberal democracy.72 
 
III.3. Parallel Case Arguments 
“To say that [democracy] is not justified in governing economic enterprises,” writes Robert 
Dahl, “is to imply that it is not justified in governing the state.”73  This general form of argument 
is a common one, shared by a number of accounts in defense of workplace democracy.  
Following Joshua Cohen, I refer to arguments of this form as parallel case arguments.74  Briefly, 
this form of argument assumes that the state ought to be governed democratically and argues that 
the features of the state that call for its democratic governance are also present in economic 
 
71 The literature Cohen cites in support of the psychological support argument, includes Ronald Mason, 
Participatory and Workplace Democracy (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1982); J. Maxwell Elder, 
“Political Efficacy at Work: The Connection between More Autonomous Forms of Workplace Organization and a 
More Participatory Politics,” American Political Science Review 75 (1981), 43-58; John Stuart Mill, Principles of 
Political Economy, book 4, chapter 6, sections 4, 6.  Edward Greenberg is skeptical of the psychological support 
argument.  See his Workplace Democracy: The Political Effects of Participation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1986).  Another study is by Melvin Seeman, “On the Personal Consequences of Alienation in Work,” American 
Sociological Review 32 (1967): 273-85.  Also, see Lane, The Market Experience for a useful discussion of the 
various formative influences that people’s experience at work has on them, especially chapter 13 along with the 
other references in notes 40, 41, and 42. 
72 An alternative argument can be found in the argument that democracy presupposes the independence of voters.  If 
being employed leads workers to lack the requisite degree of independence because they have little option but to 
follow the will of their employers, then the requirements of democracy call for one of two solutions.  Either workers 
should be disenfranchised or the workplace should be democratized.  This is analogous to arguments made about 
women’s suffrage.  I thank Robert Goodin for raising this possibility.  See his “Independence in Democratic Theory: 
A Virtue? A Necessity? Both? Neither?” Journal of Social Philosophy, 24 (1993): 50-57. 
73 Robert Dahl, A Preface to Economic Democracy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 111. 
74 Cohen, “The Economic Basis of Deliberative Democracy,” p. 27. 
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enterprises.  As an example, consider the following argument advanced by Iris Marion Young 
within the framework of Rawls’s account of justice.75 
Young argues that among the principles of justice is a “principle of self-determination” 
which requires that “individuals participate equally in the making of the decisions which will 
govern their actions within institutions of social cooperation.”76  She advances four arguments 
for the principle of self-determination.  First, Rawls argues that the principle for equal 
participation in politics transfers the conditions of equality and fair representation from the 
original position to a society’s constitution.  If so, argues Young, then equal participation should 
be extended as widely as possible.77  Second, Young argues that it is in the interests of the least 
advantaged person to organize society such that one has a claim to participate equally in basic 
decisions within an organization.78  Young’s third argument is that only by allowing for self-
determination at every level of social cooperation can society be, in Rawls’s words, “a social 
union of social unions.”  Without self-determination, the goals of a given instance of social 
cooperation cannot be shared in common.79  Fourth, Young argues that self-determination at 
every level of social cooperation best promotes the value of self-respect, which is central to 
Rawls’s account of justice.80  The principle of self-determination is meant to apply to all 
institutions of social cooperation, including economic organizations. 
In the above manner, Young advances an account for workplace democracy on grounds 
of justice.  To be certain, not all of the arguments advanced by Young need be interpreted as 
parallel case arguments.  In particular, in the case of the fourth argument, the way in which self-
 
75 Young, “Self-Determination as Principle of Justice.” 
76 Young, “Self-Determination as Principle of Justice,” p. 30. 
77 Young, “Self-Determination as Principle of Justice,” p. 39. 
78 Young, “Self-Determination as Principle of Justice,” p. 39-40. 
79 Young, “Self-Determination as Principle of Justice,” p. 40. 
80 Young, “Self-Determination as Principle of Justice,” p. 40. 
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respect is promoted in exercising democratic self-governance at the level of the state need not be 
the same as the way in which it is promoted in exercising self-governance at the level of an 
economic enterprise.  That is to say, the features about participating in decision-making at the 
level of the state that promote self-respect may be distinct from the features about participating 
in decision-making at the level economic enterprises that promote self-respect.  With that said, it 
appears that the general form of Young’s argument is that the arguments for self-determination at 
the level of the state are best served by extending the claim to participate in decision-making to 
the level of individual economic enterprises.  As such, I take Young’s account as an example of a 
parallel case argument. 
Central to parallel case arguments is to make the case that workers stand in relation to 
economic enterprises in an analogous manner as citizens stand in relation to the state.  Young’s 
principle of self-determination describes this relation in terms of one’s actions being governed by 
the decisions made within the organization.  In the contemporary philosophical literature, two 
characterizations of the nature of this relation have been advanced.  The first involves the 
concept of authority.  The second involve the concept of power.  I consider each in turn. 
Drawing on Joseph Raz’s conception of authority, Christopher McMahon advances a 
defense of workplace democracy grounded in the view that workers are subject to the authority 
of managers and employers.81  For purposes of this analysis, the central feature of Raz’s account 
of authority that is relevant is the following: when a worker recognizes someone as an authority, 
the authority’s directive to do X is not considered alongside the other reasons to do X or not to 
do X, but instead preempts these reasons to replace whatever final belief the worker may have 
 
81 Christopher McMahon, Authority and Democracy: A General Theory of Government and Management 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994) and Robin Archer, Economic Democracy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1995).  Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986). 
Justice in Production, p. 29 
Draft: 31 March 2006 
about what she ought to do.82  McMahon argues that managerial authority is more likely to have 
the reach and robustness it claims if workers take managerial directives to be preemptory 
because they are understood to coordinate cooperative activity among persons who recognize the 
authority of the person issuing directives.83  In turn, considerations of fairness and welfare-
maximization, which McMahon takes to ground all legitimate moral considerations, ground a 
presumption for democratic exercise of authority that secures such cooperation.84 
The idea that workers are subject to authority in the context of economic enterprises is 
one that finds support in both the sociological literature and the contemporary economic 
literature discussed earlier.85  The employment relationship, as discussed above, is frequently 
characterized as an authority relationship, and insofar as the manager represents the economic 
enterprise, then the manager is said to have authority over the worker.  In addition, in the 
literature on the theory of the firm, what has said to characterize the distinction between firms 
and markets is the exercise of authority within the firm.86  As such, parallel case arguments that 
rely on a relationship of authority between managers and workers to ground the case for 
workplace democracy would appear to be open to liberal egalitarians. 
At the same time, there is some controversy within contemporary economic literature 
whether or not to understand the relationship that holds between managers and workers as one of 
 
82 Raz, The Morality of Freedom. 
83 McMahon, Authority and Democracy, p. 233. 
84 McMahon, Authority and Democracy, pp. 72-73. 
85 Max Weber, Economy and Society, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1978).  Reinhard Bendix, Work and Authority in Industry (New Brunswick: Transaction, 2001). 
86 See Coase, “The Nature of the Firm,” Simon, “A formal theory of the employment relationship,” and Radner, 
“Hierarchy: The Economics of Managing.”  See also Oliver Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism 
(New York: Free Press, 1985) and Philippe Aghion and Jean Tirole, “Formal and Real Authority in Organizations,” 
Journal of Political Economy 105 (1997): 1-29.  Defining formal authority as the possession of decision rights, 
George Baker, Robert Gibbons, and Kevin Murphy write, “tracing this chain of authority up the hierarchy, we 
eventually reach a person (sole proprietor) or group (shareholders) who can be thought of as owning all of the 
decision rights in the organization.  In short, formal authority resides at the top.”  See their “Informal Authority in 
Organization,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organizations 15 (1999): 56-73, p. 56. 
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authority, at least in the sense required for authority-based conceptions of the parallel case 
argument to succeed.  Following the lead of Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz along with 
Michael Jensen and William Meckling, a number of authors have argued against the view that 
there is authority in the firm.87  As Alchian and Demsetz have famously written, “telling an 
employee to type this letter rather than to file that document is like my telling a grocer to sell me 
this brand of tuna rather than that brand of bread.”88  Furthermore, in discussing the possibility 
that there is authority within the firm, a number of authors appear to have in mind the idea of 
power, rather than that of authority in the Razian sense.89  This brings us to the possibility that 
the parallel case argument is more plausibly grounded in an interpretation of the relationship 
between the manager and the worker as one of power. 
Normally, if background conditions are reasonably just such that workers are able to find 
employment, workers are not thought to be subject to the exercise of power because the cost to 
exit is low.  Economic literature on the theory of the firm, however, points to situations in which 
workers can be subject to power as the result of certain features inherent in the productive 
process that are largely independent of the nature of background conditions.  In particular, the 
exercise of power arises because the nature of work makes it such that workers face high costs to 
exiting an economic organization once they have entered.90 
 
87 Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz, “Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization,” The 
American Economic Review 62 (1972): 777-795, p. 777.  Michael Jensen and William Meckling, “Theory of the 
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,” The Journal of Financial Economics 3 
(1976): 305-360. 
88 “Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization,” p. 777. 
89 Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart, “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral 
Integration,” Journal of Political Economy 94 (1986): 691-719; Oliver Hart and John Moore, “Property Rights and 
the Nature of the Firm,” Journal of Political Economy 98 (1990): 1119-58; and Oliver Hart and John Moore, “A 
Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital,” Quarterly Journal of Economics (1994): 841-79.  
These authors recognize that the right of owners and managers to control access to capital gives them a degree of 
power. 
90 The following discussion draws upon Nien-hê Hsieh, “Rawlsian Justice and Workplace Republicanism,” Social 
Theory and Practice, vol. 31, no. 1 (2005): 115-142. 
Justice in Production, p. 31 
Draft: 31 March 2006 
Economic theory points to three sorts of cost.  First, because a worker’s contribution to 
the firm depends upon her investment in developing firm-specific human capital, she will not be 
able to command as high a return outside of the specific firm in which she works.  Given that 
greater investment in firm-specific human capital increases a worker’s productivity, from the 
standpoint of both the worker and the firm it may not even be desirable to eliminate the cost to 
exit.91  Second, because the ability to monitor workers is costly, employers will find it in their 
interest to pay workers more than the market-clearing wage so that there is a cost to exiting one’s 
place of employment.92  Third, there are costs associated with locating a new job and making the 
transition to it. 
In the case of work that requires highly firm-specific investments in human capital, the 
argument from the exercise of power is plausible.  However, critics might point out that such an 
argument in support of a claim to self-governance by workers would not appear to apply to those 
workers in occupations that require little firm-specific investment, who are precisely the sorts of 
workers for whom the concern about self-governance arises. 
In response to this criticism, three points may be raised.  First, as discussed in section I.3, 
there may be a class of work that is unavoidable altogether.  Second, there is reason to hold that 
having work is an important source of self-respect.93  In turn, there may be significant costs to 
 
91 On these and related points, see Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales, “Power in a Theory of the Firm,” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 113 (1998): 387-432; Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout, “A Team Production Theory of 
Corporate Law,” Virginia Law Review 84 (1999): 247-328; and The New Relationship: Human Capital in the 
American Corporation, edited by Margaret Blair and Thomas Kochan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution 
Press, 2000). 
92 For the classic accounts of efficiency wages, see George Akerlof, “Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 97 (1982): 543-569 and Janet Yellen, “Efficiency Wage Models of 
Unemployment,” American Economic Review Proceedings 74 (1984): 200-205. 
93 Whether or not work is provided by government guarantee is a separate issue.  On this question, see Donald 
Moon, “The Moral Basis of the Welfare State,” in Democracy and the Welfare State, edited by Amy Gutmann 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988): 27-52, p. 33.  See also Richard Arneson, “Is Work Special? Justice 
and the Distribution of Employment,” American Political Science Review 84 (1990): 1127-47.  See also Solow, 
Work and Welfare.  For classic studies of the effect of unemployment see Marie Jahoda, Employment and 
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exiting work altogether such that absent additional protections, employers may be regarded as 
exercising power over workers.  Third, much of the literature on the theory of the firm 
emphasizes the need for decision-making in the context of economic activity; what distinguishes 
economic organizations from markets is that they involve decisions that cannot be specified at 
the outset of a contractual relationship.  If this is correct, then workers will be subject to power 
when they exit one firm and enter another. 
A number of authors have grounded the case for workplace democracy in terms of a 
relation of power between employer and employee that they regard as analogous to the relation 
of power between state and citizen.  Dahl is one such author.94  Michael Walzer also advances a 
similar argument by challenging the alleged differences between political and economic 
organizations.95  Even if the power-based parallel case arguments can plausibly make the case 
that the relationship between managers and workers is best characterized in terms of power, a 
number of other objections have been raised.  These objections raise questions about other 
dimensions of the parallel drawn between the citizens and workers. 
One objection concerns the scope over which managerial discretion is understood to 
extend.  “If a firm doesn’t like the way you do your job,” writes Jan Narveson, “can it send men 
 
Unemployment: A Social-Psychological Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) and Marie 
Jahoda, Paul Lazarsfeld, and Hans Zeisel, Marienthal: The Sociography of an Unemployed Community (New 
Brunswick: Transaction, 2002 originally published 1933). 
94 “Like a state, then a firm can also be viewed as a political system in which relations of power exist between 
governments and the governed.”  See Dahl, A Preface to Economic Democracy, p. 115.  For a discussion of Dahl’s 
argument, see Robert Mayer, “Robert Dahl and the Right to Workplace Democracy,” The Review of Politics, 63 
(2001): 221-247; Robert Dahl, “A Right to Workplace Democracy? Response to Robert Mayer,” The Review of 
Politics, 63 (2001): 249-253; Robert Mayer, “A Rejoinder to Robert Dahl,” The Review of Politics, 63 (2001): 255-
257.  Ian Shaprio advances an argument that is also grounded in a concern about power.  See Shapiro, Democratic 
Justice. 
95 “An economic enterprise,” according to Walzer, “seems very much like a town.” In economic enterprises, 
according to Walzer, managers “claim a kind of power to which they have no right.”  Walzer, Spheres of Justice, p. 
300. 
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with guns who will put you in prison if you don’t do it the way the boss says?”96  The scope of 
managerial discretion, to be legitimate, is limited in comparison to the scope of discretion 
claimed by the state.  To the extent that the claim to political democracy depends on the scope of 
discretion claimed by the state, opponents parallel case arguments might object that such 
arguments fail. 
A second related objection that opponents might raise concerns the difference in the ends 
for which the mechanisms of governance are intended in the firm and the state.  In the case of a 
political community, there is both an open-endedness and an expansiveness with regard to the 
ends that might be pursued collectively through the mechanisms of governance.  In contrast, in 
the case of an economic enterprise, the ends of governance are purposive and directed at a 
limited set of ends revolving around economically productive activity.  This is not to deny that 
workers and shareholders might come to attach great meaning to their membership in economic 
enterprises.  Given the importance of work and the amount of time spent at work, individuals 
might come to value their membership in economic enterprises on a par with their membership 
in the state.  Instead, on this objection, insofar as the open-endedness and expansiveness of the 
ends of the state help to justify the need for political democracy, even if the mechanisms of 
governance in economic enterprises are similar to those of the state, the instrumentalist nature of 
governance in economic enterprises may restrict the extension of arguments for political 
democracy to the economic enterprise.97 
 
 
96 Jan Narveson, “Democracy and Economic Rights,” Social Philosophy and Policy 9 (1992): 29-61, p. 53. 
97 For one debate, see Robert Phillips and Joshua Margolis, “Toward an Ethics of Organizations,” Business Ethics 
Quarterly 9 (1999): 619-638.  Edwin Hartman,  “Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy, and Organizational Ethics: 
A Response to Phillips and Margolis,” Business Ethics Quarterly 11 (2001): 643-687.  Jeffrey Moriarty, “On the 
Relevance of Political Philosophy to Business Ethics.” Business Ethics Quarterly 15 (2005): 455-475. 
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III.4. Beyond Parallel Case Arguments 
The above discussion suggests the possibility of a somewhat different approach.  This approach 
retains the focus on the power that exercised by managers, but locates concern with this power in 
reasons that are distinct from those that ground a claim to democratic participation by citizens in 
the mechanisms of government.  In this section, I outline one argument along these lines based 
upon an account that I have advanced elsewhere.98 
The need for decision-making at work involves the possibility of substantial interference 
in the lives of workers with regard to three dimensions: first, decisions that either direct a worker 
to perform specific tasks or specifically limit the actions that a worker might take within the 
context of her employment with the enterprise; second, decisions that are made directly about a 
worker and relate not so much to her actions, but to other features of her employment, such as 
working conditions, compensation, or promotion; and third, decisions that are not made directly 
about the worker, but nevertheless affect her, such as decisions to change what a firm produces 
or to relocate a firm’s operations.  If little or no justification can be given for instances of such 
interference in terms of the worker’s interests upon which the interference is visited, then those 
instances of interference are arbitrary.  When speaking about arbitrary interference, I have in 
mind severe forms of arbitrary interference.  It is severe both in terms of the impact of the 
interference on the interests those on whom it is visited and in its arbitrariness because there is 
little or no justification for it in terms of the interests of those on whom it is visited.99 
 
98 Hsieh, “Rawlsian Justice and Workplace Republicanism.” 
99 To be clear, an instance of interference can be arbitrary in this sense even if the interference follows from a 
decision that is justified in the context of the decision-making procedure internal to economic organizations.  That is 
to say, I assume that it is possible to describe a decision-making procedure in a positive sense without reference to 
whether the economic regime that permits such a decision-making procedure is consistent with the principles of 
justice.  As a further point of clarification, it should be noted that the lack of justification in terms of the worker’s 
interests upon which the interference is visited is understood only as a sufficient condition for the interference to be 
considered arbitrary. 
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Drawing on Rawls’s account of justice, I argue there is a basic right to protection from 
such arbitrary interference at work.  In Rawls’s account, for something to be accorded the status 
of a basic right, it must be counted among the social bases of self-respect, which are those “those 
aspects of basic institutions normally essential if citizens are to have a lively sense of their worth 
as persons and to be able to advance their ends with self-confidence.”100  A number of aspects, I 
argue, place protection against arbitrary interference at work among the social bases of self-
respect.  Of particular concern is that the arbitrary interference under consideration is 
interference that is visited by the decision of one individual on another individual within the 
context of an institutionally sanctioned decision-making procedure. To visit arbitrary 
interference on another individual is to treat her as though her interests and judgments did not 
matter.101  As such, arbitrary interference is to treat an individual as lacking in standing or in 
worth.  It is the absence of treating another individual with respect.  To lack protection against 
such interference is to be placed in a position in which it is permissible, by virtue of the basic 
structure, to be treated by another individual as lacking in standing or in worth.  It is difficult to 
imagine situations more damaging to developing a sense of self-worth and self-confidence than 
to be in such a position.102  In turn, I argue that just as there is a basic right to personal property 
on Rawls’s account, so too should there be a basic right to protection against arbitrary 
interference at work. 
 
100 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, p. 59. 
101 Joseph Raz makes a similar point with respect to authority.  He writes, “we have views of what interpersonal 
relations are morally acceptable.  They involve mutual respect, reciprocity, etc.  One-sided submission to the will of 
an authority seems to violate these precepts.”  See Joseph Raz, ‘Introduction’, in Authority, edited by Joseph Raz 
(New York: New York University Press, 1990), p. 16. 
102 To see this, consider an example given by Stuart White in which a workers says to himself, “I had better not go to 
those gay clubs any more because if my boss finds out he might sack me, and I will then be destitute.  Instead, I had 
better go to the Young Conservative’s Association to impress him.”  Stuart White, The Civic Minimum (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 47. 
Justice in Production, p. 36 
Draft: 31 March 2006 
Given the costs to exiting an individual place of work and the costs to exiting work 
altogether discussed in section III.3, there is reason to hold that an economic regime relying on 
the right to exit does not provide adequate realization of the basic right to protection against 
arbitrary interference at work.  At first, it may appear that limiting the discretion of managers is 
the way in which to realize this basic right.  There is, however, a limit to the desirability and 
efficacy of protecting against arbitrary interference by constraining the scope of discretion in the 
decision-making process internal to economic enterprises.  As discussed in section III.3, to the 
extent that decisions cannot be specified from the outset of any working relationship, the 
exercise of discretion becomes a required feature of economic activity and the basis for 
economic organizations in the first place.  Hence, the challenge is to protect workers against 
arbitrary instances of interference without ruling out discretion altogether. 
Workplace democracy provides one way to meet this challenge.  By allowing workers to 
contest managerial decisions that result in severe forms of interference as part of the decision-
making process internal to economic enterprises, workers are able to protect themselves against 
arbitrary interference.  The protection accorded by workplace democracy is especially important 
when the cost to pursuing external remedies is prohibitively expensive or when the interference 
is difficult to rectify ex post.  In this manner, it appears that we arrive at an argument for 
workplace democracy that is grounded in a liberal egalitarian account of justice.103 
 
103 Following Philip Pettit’s interpretation of the essence of republicanism as the constraint of the state’s exercise of 
discretionary power and the guarantee of a citizen’s right to contest decisions made by the state, I call such an 
economic regime a regime of workplace republicanism.  Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and 
Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).  Pettit focuses on a specific aspect of the republican tradition, 
namely what he takes to be its conception of freedom.  There are other elements of the republican tradition that 
scholars have come to see as integral.  For an interpretation of the republican tradition that is along the lines that 
Pettit adopts, see Quentin Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).  For 
a listing of additional scholarship along these lines, see Pettit, Republicanism, p. 7.  See also Philip Pettit, “The 
Freedom of the City: A Republican Ideal,” in Alan Hamlin and Philip Pettit, eds., The Good Polity (Oxford: 
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At the same time, this argument may strike proponents of workplace democracy as rather 
limited.  The basic right under consideration is not a right to workplace democracy.  Nor is it 
comparable to the right to democratic governance at the level of the state.  Instead, the right 
concerns protection against arbitrary interference at work, and this right may be realized in part 
by provisions other than the participation of workers in the governance of economic enterprises, 
such as legal protections and remedies. 
Rather than considering these points to reflect deficiencies of the argument, I take them 
to reflect the appropriate way in which the structure of economic production can be considered 
within a liberal egalitarian account of justice.  In extending the right to democratic government 
from the level of the state to economic enterprises, parallel case arguments appear to locate the 
institutional guarantee to workplace democracy at the level of a basic right.  Recall that although 
the structure of the economy is part of the basic structure, Rawls is clear that the institutional 
guarantees regarding the structure of the economy are not among the basic rights.  As such, it is 
appropriate not to locate the right to participate in the governance of economic enterprises at the 
level of a basic right.  The argument advanced in this section stays true to this feature of the basic 
structure while aiming to capture the intuition that not all matters associated with work should 
fall outside the realm of basic rights. 
By focusing on the protection of workers against arbitrary interference, rather than 
worker control itself, this account also puts us in a position to evaluate two contemporary 
developments.  The first is the increase in ownership by employees of the companies in which 
they work either directly (e.g., stock options and ownership plans) or indirectly (e.g., institutional 
 
Blackwell, 1989) and Quentin Skinner, “The Third Concept of Liberty,” Proceedings of the British Academy, 112 
(2001): 237-268. 
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investors and pension funds).104  As employees come to own a greater share within the firms in 
which they work, even if there is no change in governance structure, is this a positive 
development from the perspective of protection against arbitrary interference?  A second 
contemporary development is the idea of the worker as an entrepreneur or independent 
contractor.  At first, it would appear that by removing oneself from the employment relationship 
would address the concerns motivating proponents of workplace democracy.  However, there is 
much to suggest that this is undesirable from the perspective of workers.105  The emphasis on 
protection against arbitrary interference can help to account for this intuition without having to 
rely upon the independent value of the collective nature of decision-making.  It is in the context 
of large-scale economic organizations that individuals can also find economic security. 
 
IV. COLLECTIVE CONTROL OF THE MEANS OF PRODUCTION 
The third level at which the structure of economic production has been called into question is at 
the level of society as a whole.  Reforms proposed at this level aim for the collective control of 
the means of production by citizens as a whole.  The discussion in this section begins by 
addressing the relation between workplace democracy and a regime in which citizens engage in 
collective control of the means of production.106 
It seems possible to have collective control of the means of the production in a way that 
lacks any provision for worker participation in the governance of economic enterprises.  For 
 
104 For a discussion of employee ownership in the American context, see John Logue and Jacquelyn Yates, The Real 
World of Employee Ownership (Ithaca: ILR Press, 2001).  For a contemporary discussion about pension funds, see 
Archon Fung, Tessa Hebb, and Joel Rogers, Working Capital: The Power of Labor’s Pensions (Ithaca: ILR Press, 
2001).  For an earlier discussion on this topic, see Peter Drucker, The Unseen Revolution: How Pension Fund 
Socialism Came to America (New York: HarperCollins, 1976).  
105 See Richard Sennett, The Corrosion of Character: The Personal Consequences of Work in the New Capitalism 
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1998).  See also Edwards and Wajcman, The Politics of Working Life. 
106 I thank Robert Goodin for pressing me to address this question. 
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example, John Roemer’s proposal for socialism does not include provisions for workplace 
democracy.107  Under such accounts, citizens as a group collectively exercise control of 
economic enterprises such that the workers within a given economic enterprise have no special 
claim to exercise control over it.  The question then arises whether it is possible to have 
workplace democracy without collective control by citizens of the means of production at the 
level of society as a whole.  If workplace democracy involves control by workers of capital at the 
level of individual economic enterprises, does it not follow that there ought to be collective 
control of the means of production at the level of society as a whole? 
In response, in the context of a liberal egalitarian account of justice in production, it 
would appear that citizens already have a kind of control over the means of the production by 
way of the democratic process.  Recall that in a Rawlsian scheme, just as there is no basic right 
to participate in the control of the means of production, there is no basic right to control capital 
on a private basis.  Accordingly, there is no basic right against the regulation of the means of 
production.  Insofar as citizens exercise democratic control over the legislation that regulates the 
use of capital within an economy, they exercise a kind of ultimate control over the means of 
production.  For example, democracies may decide to restrict the outflow of capital or restrict the 
private ownership of certain resources, such as land.  On this view, the question posed above has 
the relationship the other way around.  It is because the concerns that citizens have cannot be 
adequately addressed at the level of the political process that workplace democracy is in part 
required.  It seems there is no reason, in this respect, that private ownership and control of capital 
is inconsistent with workplace democracy. 
 
107 See Roemer, A Future for Socialism. 
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For this characterization of the nature of control exercised by citizens to be plausible, 
however, it would appear that at least one set of restrictions on the private control of capital must 
be in place.  These are restrictions that relate to maintaining what Rawls terms the “fair value of 
political liberties.”  By this Rawls means that “citizens similarly gifted and motivated have 
roughly an equal chance of influencing the government’s policy and of attaining positions of 
authority irrespective of their economic and social class.” 108  There are two arguments that point 
to the difficulties of maintaining the fair value of political liberties in the absence of any 
regulation on the private control of capital.  The first argument concerns the various ways in 
which privately held economic resources can be brought to bear to influence the political 
process.109  The second argument concerns the constraints placed upon governments as a result 
of the private control of capital.  Insofar as the general well-being of the economy as a whole 
depends upon the investment decisions of capitalists, political decisions will be constrained to 
the extent that the level of economic well-being citizens desire requires the continued investment 
by capitalists.110The plausibility of these arguments and the sorts of regulations they require 
remain open to debate.  There is reason to doubt, however, that liberal egalitarians can ignore 
altogether thinking about the need for some degree of collective control by citizens of the means 
of production and the form of that control. 
 
 
108 Justice as Fairness, p. 46. 
109 Joshua Cohen refers to this as the “resource constraint argument.”  See “The Economic Basis of Deliberative 
Democracy,” p. 29.  Cohen cites Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1957), part 3 and Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers, On Democracy: toward a Transformation of American 
Society (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1983), ch. 3. 
110 On this, see Cohen, “The Economic Basis of Deliberative Democracy,” p. 28.  Cohen cites Adam Przeworski, 
Capitalism and Social Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), ch. 4; Adam Przeworski and 
Michael Wallerstein, “Structural Dependence of the State on Capital,” American Political Science Review; Cohen 
and Rogers, On Democracy, ch. 3.  See also S.E. Finer, “The Political Power of Private Capital,” Sociological 
Review 3 (1955): 279-294 and 4 (1956). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Liberal egalitarianism has been criticized for paying insufficient attention to what justice requires 
for the institutions that structure economic production.  In the light of such criticism, I 
considered a number of arguments that liberal egalitarians might give for the kinds of 
institutional reforms that critics have proposed.  These reforms include institutional guarantees 
for (1) meaningful work, (2) worker participation in the governance of economic enterprises, and 
(3) democratic participation in the control of the means of production at the level of society.  For 
each of these reforms, the case was made that there is good reason to hold that plausible 
arguments, grounded in a broadly liberal egalitarian account of justice, can be made support of 
them or at least some version of them.  Liberal egalitarianism, it appears, has much to say not 
only about questions of distribution, but also about questions of production. 
This paper points to areas of further inquiry if the arguments canvassed in this discussion 
are to be developed fully.  One task is to articulate more fully what qualifies as work that fails to 
meet the standard of meaningful work in the context of a liberal egalitarian account of justice.  
Another task is to articulate what qualifies as an adequate opportunity for meaningful work or for 
work that is democratically governed.  It also remains to investigate the empirical claims that 
underlie the formative arguments for meaningful work and workplace democracy.  With respect 
to the collective control of the means of production, the paper suggests that liberal egalitarians 
cannot afford to ignore investigating what restrictions on the use of private capital are required to 
maintain the fair value of political liberties.  Taken together, the arguments in this paper suggest 
that much work remains for liberal egalitarians to be certain that the institutions that structure 
economic production meet the requirements of justice. 
